Issue No. 31 - Spring 2019

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Newsletter
Year: 
2019
 
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Newsletter

Issue No. 31 - Spring 2019

News & Events

 
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24th CTN Workshop 

The CTN Annual Workshop will be held in Marseilles, France  next 16-17 May 2019, organised by the CTN team at Aix-Marseilles. 
Key note speakers: Matt Jackson, Asuman Ozdaglar, Adam Szeidl 
> Info & Registrations
> Subscribe our mailing list for programme updates

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Workshop - Networks: Information, Contracts, and Communities

The workshop will take place on June 13-14, 2019 in Barcelona, within the framework of the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum. The workshop calls on outstanding contributions in the broad literature on the economics of social and economic networks  Read more >

Sixth EPICENTER Spring Course in Epistemic Game Theory 2019

Maastricht, Netherlands 1-15 July 2019

Elias Tsakas (Maastricht team) will be one of the instructors of the course  > Event info

 

Economic Design and Algorithms in St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg Russia 8-10 July 2019

Francis Bloch (CES team) will give a keynote speach at the event, organised by HSE and Glasgow team 
> Event info

 

1st AMSE Summer School - Recent advances in Search and Matching

Marseilles, France 2-4 July 2019

AMSE has launched the first edition of this school  > Event info

M-BEES & M-BEPS
Maastricht, Netherlands, 3-4 June 2019
Organised by Maastricht  > Events info

 

MATCH-UP 2019 - 5th International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences
Ascona, Switzerland, 26-29 May 2019
Flip Klijn (MOVE team) will give a keynote speach at the event > Event info

 

Workshop and Tutorial on Fair Division Theory
Rome, Italy, 23-25 May 2019
Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin (Glasgow team) will be keynote lectures at the event  > Event info

Selected Publications

 
 

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From Theory to Application

Network Effects in Crowdfunding

Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher

The advances in FinTech are concomitant with the development of digital platforms, such as Ethereum, LendingClub, or PayPal. The decisions that users make on such platforms are highly interdependent, insofar as these decisions jointly condition the value that users will obtain from interacting on the platform... Read more ›

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Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public‐good economies
Anne van den Nouweland, Agnieszka Rusinowska

We provide a bargaining foundation for the concept of ratio equilibrium in public‐good economies. We define a bargaining game of alternating offers, in which players bargain to determine their cost shares of public‐good production and a level of public good.

Read more ›

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The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environment

Thomas Demuynck, P. Jean‐Jacques Herings, Riccardo D. Saulle, Christian Seel

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is defined for a general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity assumptions, it is also unique.

Read more ›

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Price and network dynamics in the European carbon market

Andreas Karpf, Antoine Mandel, Stefano Battiston

This paper presents an analysis of the European Emission Trading System as a transaction network. It is shown that, given the lack of well-identified trading institutions, industrial actors had to resort to local connections and financial intermediaries to participate in the market.

Read more ›

Article

Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment

Herve Moulin, A. Seth, Bart Taub

We investigate how, in a situation with two players in which noncooperation is the only equilibrium, cooperation can be achieved via costly investment. We find that in the resulting equilibria, cooperation is an all-or-nothing outcome, that is, either there is full cooperation by both players, or no cooperation at all.

Read more ›

Article

Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming?

Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz

Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming (i.e., some users joining both platforms). If initially both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on one side exclusive access to its users on the other side. If then one side multihomes, platforms compete on the singlehoming side and exert monopoly power on the multihoming side.

Read more ›

 

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