Articles

Articles authored by researchers who are part of the Coalition Theory Network and published in international reviews are displayed in this section.

2012

Probabilistic voting equilibria under nonlinear candidate payoffs Alexei Zakharov Tags: Social Choice	Probabilistic assignment of objects: Characterizing the serial rule Anna Bogomolnaia and Eun Jeong Heo
The partnered core of a game with side payments Myrna Wooders, Philip J. Reny and Eyal Winter	The Theory of Clubs and Competitive Coalitions Myrna Wooders
Games and Economic Behavior Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno Tags: Social Choice	Values for Markovian coalition processes Michel Grabisch and Ulrich Faigle
Games induced by the partitioning of a graph M. Grabisch, A. Skoda Tags: Game Theory & Graphs	On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference proﬁles Jordi Massó , Ruth Martínez , Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo
Gerrymander-proof representative democracies Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin	Cardinal Bayesian Allocation Mechanisms without Transfers Antonio Miralles
Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: On What Domains Are They also Sufficient? Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno	Smooth multibidding mechanisms David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou
Risk taking under heterogenous revenue sharing Frédéric Deroïan and Mohamed Belhaj	Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein and Geoffroy de Clippel
Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Jackson O. Matthew and Xu Tan	Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Jackson O. Matthew and Xu Tan
Homophily and long-run integration in social networks Yann Bramoullé, Sergio Currarini, Matthew Jackson, Paolo Pin and Brian Rogers	The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria Jordi Massó, Daniel Jaume and Alejandro Neme
Uni-dimensional Models of Coalition Formation: non-existence of Stable Partitions Alexei Savvateev Tags: Coalition Formation Theory	Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum Tags: Bargaining Theory, Coalition Formation Theory

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